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King, Donald Richard (M.A., English Literature)
The Relationship of Morality to Literary Criticism 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Charles Nilon
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the 
relationship of morality to literary criticism in order 
to determine the relevance of morality as an objective 
critical concept. Some, critics, such as the formalists, 
insist that morality is irrelevant to literary criticism 
because it is a subjective concept. Others, such as Leo 
Tolstoy and Yvor Winters, insist that the concept of 
morality provides the final critical factor in the judg­
ment of a literary work. As a result of the different 
points of view, the concept of morality in literary criti­
cism is confusing.
Each of the above points of view can be identified 
as it appears in literary criticism, and each can be re­
jected from objective literary criticism as erroneous. 
There is, however, one objective sense in which morality 
can be used as an objective critical concept: that is,
morality as it appears in relation to dramatic conflict.
If a writer chooses to treat an incident concerning 
characters and their actions in regard to a choice between 
good and evil, a moral incident, his choice will impose
restrictions on his treatment of the incident. If he does 
not conscientiously follow the imposed restrictions, 
serious artistic errors will result.
An examination of the erroneous points of view to 
discover their faults, and an analysis of literary works 
which treat a moral incident comprehensively, indicate 
that the concept of morality is not only relevant to 
objective literary criticism but that it is a valuable and 
important concept.
This abstract of about 244 words is approved as to form 
and content. I recommend its publication.
Signed
Instructor in charge or dissertation
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INTRODUCTION
In discussions of literary criticism the concept of 
morality creates a great deal of confusion; and the confu­
sion results primarily from the use of the same term, 
morality, to mean different things: one critic may see
morality in literature as the didactic, and may subsequent­
ly condemn morality in literature on didactic grounds; 
another sees morality as the function of literature, for he 
feels that literature should provide an expression of moral­
ity which is cognitive but not didactic; and still another 
may insist that we cannot talk about morality in literature 
because literature is autonomous and our conventional 
morality cannot apply to its isolated world. It will be
■4b
the purpose of this paper to examine briefly each of these 
ways in which "morality” is used and to determine whether 
each is relevant to literary criticism. When the relevancy 
of each has been pointed out, I shall point out that there 
is at least one sense in which we may use "morality" as a 
valuable critical term: that is morality as it is concerned
with dramatic conflict.
In order to determine the relationship of morality 
to literary criticism, it will be necessary to examine each 
sense in which the term is used in regard to what we feel
2literary criticism, or the function of the critic, to be.
I shall take the position that the critic's function is 
to help others to perceive the excellences of the work of 
literary art. In doing this,a he determines whether a 
literary work is a work of art; and, if it is, he deter­
mines how fine a work it is; and he gives the objective 
reasons why he feels it to be a fine work. The first two 
of these activities are acts of evaluation which come after 
the critical process. The critical process itself consists 
of the objective reasons given for the evaluation. The 
process is an analytic one in which the critic abstracts 
qualities from the work in order to say something about it. 
My concern will be with the analytical process. Certainly 
the critic's job is more comprehensive than what I have 
given here as a definition. In the last analysis, we may 
agree with Henry James that "Nothing, of course, will ever 
take the place of the good old fashion of 'liking' a work 
of art or not liking it: the most improved criticism will
not abolish that primitive, that ultimate test.”1 But for 
the sake of objective criticism we must keep our criticism 
clean, as Matthew Arnold has warned us in "The Study of 
Poetry," of the personal estimate and other subjective 
factors. And we must limit the ground to be covered. As 
an excuse for inadequate definition and the lack of a
^Henry James, The Art of Fiction and Other Essays 
(New York, 1948), p. 1ST
comprehensive point of view, I think I must take sides with 
Norman Foerster when he says; "The only completely scru— 
pulous critic is the completely silent critic."^ I shall 
not be silent; my examination of morality as a critical 
factor, to determine its relevancy or irrelevancy, will 
proceed on objective grounds.
The aspects of morality which bring about confusion 
and need clarification are the confusion of didacticism 
with other considerations of morality; the confusion of the 
function of literature in the world with literary criticism; 
and the moral attitude, which stems from the moral judg­
ment of the artist and may emerge in the work as dramatic 
moral conflict.
The didactic is the moral as a message; it is a 
teaching device which offers instruction along a definite 
course. In its most obtrusive form, the didactic element 
appears as the platitude such as: "Kind hearts are more
than coronets / And simple faith than Norman blood," or 
"Resolve to be thyself; and know that he / Who finds him­
self loses his misery!" The platitude offers an easy or 
final solution to the problems of life which the intelli­
gent reader cannot accept. This form of the didactic is 
most offensive because it protrudes from the work; it is 
conspicuous, for it overrides the form which carries it.
.. . 2Ihi Intent of the Critic, ed. Donald A. Stonffpr*(Princeton, 1941), p. 76.
In its more subtle form the didactic appears in tone, the 
attitude of the author. A novel of social protest such 
as The Grapes of Wrath, is didactic in tone; its purpose 
is to instruct. The critic ordinarily is concerned with 
the didactic only in a negative way since the didactic 
protrusion detracts from the work. In speaking of the 
didactic, John Dewey points out that "Mr. Garrod, a 
follower of Matthew Arnold in more senses than one, has 
wittily said that what we resent in didactic poetry is not 
that it teaches, but that it does not teach, its incom- 
petency." If the work in which the didactic appears as 
theme or conclusion is successful, it is usually success­
ful in spite of its didactic elements.
The second aspect of morality which causes confusion 
is the confusion of the function of literature in the world 
with literary criticism: for example, Tolstoy was con­
cerned with the function of literature (and the other arts *' -
as well) as a uniting power which should bind man to man 
or man to God. Those works which did not obviously fall 
within either of these conditions he considered "immoral” 
and were therefore not admitted into his canon of art.
This type of criticism imposes a false restriction on the 
art work: criticism becomes a problem of deciding whether
the art work fits an imposed definition of function instead
3John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York, 1958),p . 346.
5of a question of the aesthetic excellence of the individual 
work. The literary critic is not concerned with how the 
art work does or should function in the world; that is a 
problem for the philosopher, *the aesthetician. The philos­
opher has his own problems in determining a total world 
scheme, and the problem of placing aesthetics in that total 
scheme is compounded by the complexity of the total problem 
in such a way that the critic may become confounded when 
he tries to apply the arguments of the philosopher to the 
practice of criticism. Certainly Tolstoy's confusion led 
him to inaccurate judgment.
Other problems are created by the confusion of 
aesthetics with criticism. The philosopher, for example, 
may lump all art (poetry, music, painting, and sculpture) 
under the title of aesthetics and proceed to talk about 
the function of art; but the critic's problem is different: 
the critic of painting, to whom vision is of primary im- 
portance, and the literary critic, to whom vision is negli­
gible, surely understand that the criteria for the judg­
ment of painting and poem as works of art are somewhat 
different. It is this kind of confusion, which exists in 
the disparity of the goals of the philosopher and the goals 
of the critic, that arises when the critic who would insist
14See Etienne Gilson's Painting and Reality for a 
discussion of the particular physical qualities of 
painting and sculpture which distinguish them from other arts.
that morality has no place in critical discussion because 
art is autonomous, points to Croce’s theory to support his 
autonomous position. It is true that for Croce art is 
autonomous and that morality 'tias no place in the aesthetic 
experience. But the critic should unterstand that in 
Croce’s Aesthetic, the "pure aesthetic" is contemplative 
and criticism itself has no place. We find that the 
philosopher is seldom helpful to the practicing critic.
The art work may, in fact, serve as a uniting power; it 
may function in any number of ways; it may be autonomous; 
but the critic must determine whether it is art, and must 
analyze the work to indicate its excellences.
The critic is interested in morality as the didactic 
only in a negative way,and morality as a function of liter­
ature is detrimental to objective criticism because it im­
poses dogmatic restrictions on criticism. The critic who 
would throw out any consideration of morality as a critical 
term on the grounds that art is autonomous may also be con­
fused about the goals of criticism: criticism must neces­
sarily invade the autonomy of art in order to analyze it. 
There is one aspect of morality which is useful to objec­
tive criticism, however, and that is the aspect that I 
shall call the moral attitude. In his article "The Moral 
Effect of Art," Sidney Zink is concerned with a functional 
aspect of art: that is, the moral effect of art on the
* ♦ • .ttindividual# Although the thesis of the article is not use­
ful to the literary critic, we can abstract a definition of
6
7morality which is both useful and workable from his article. 
One part of the definition offers a morality which does not 
impose dogmatic standards:
Morality is not chiefly an affair of the 
affirmation of a belief, or the performance 
of a particular act, or movement by an emo­
tional tendency; rather it is a conscientious­
ness of mind and will in the scrutiny and 
actualization of values. Neither belief nor 
action nor feeling possesses moral value until 
it is rationally developed and deliberately 
intended.
Another part of the definition offers a workable morality 
for the literary critic concerned with dramatic conflict:
The moral attitude is possible only in a 
moral experience, and the moral experience is 
possible only in a moral conflict— that is, 
in a conflict of values such that the human 
agent is forced into a questioning of his 
knowledge about, and behavior in pursuit of, 
the good. The moral attitude is that of con­
scientious pursuit of the right solution to a 
moral conflict.^
The moral attitude will not be useful in the criticism of 
all literary works: it is not helpful in an examination of
the short poem. It is functional only in the extended dra­
matic context; that is, in the longer literary work con­
cerned with characters and their actions. It is especially
Zink assumes that there is an ideal good, about 
which we can learn, and therefore that there can be a moral 
situation. The moral situation does not arise from habi­
tual action, however, for "Action undetermined by reflection 
may be 'good* in a utilitarian sense (bringing about plea­
sant consequences to one’s self or to others); but it will 
have been without moral quality, for it will have been 
without moral effort." Sidney Zink, "The Moral Effect of 
Art," Ethics, LX (1950), 261-274.
8important in works such as King Lear, Moby Dick, and The 
Scarlet Letter. It emerges in classical tragedy and in 
what I would call serious fiction. In such cases, the 
moral attitude provides the f^ame structure for the entire 
work. If an author chooses an incident to write about 
which is essentially moral, an incident which is concerned 
with good and evil in the world, the choice of incident 
will demand a treatment in terms of the moral attitude in 
order to prevent serious artistic errors such as a split 
in thematic unity, inadequate character development, or a 
questioning of credibility. The moral attitude will not 
write the work for the artist, but it will dictate certain 
limits of treatment for the artist which cannot be violated 
without risking artistic error.
The critics for and against morality as a critical 
factor have offered only brief, vague or confusing comments 
concerning it. In my discussion I hope to approach the 
problem more directly by examining the aspects of morality 
which I have summarized above; and by this examination I 
hope to clarify the relation of morality to literary criti­
cism and to offer some tenable support for morality as an 
objective critical factor.
In my discussion of the aspects of morality as they 
occur in literature and criticism, the treatment will be 
exclusive, I do not intend to give a chronological survey 
of the appearance of these aspects in literary criticism; 
neither do I intend a critique of the criticism of the
9individual critics discussed• The examples used ape used 
arbitrarily to indicate that problems exist, and they are 
specific and extended in order to avoid an amorphous 
essay*
CHAPTER ONE
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS OF MORALITY 
IN LITERARY CRITICISM
I: The Didactic as the Moral
As we have suggested, some critics are especially 
concerned with morality as the didactic; and are therefore 
opposed to morality as a positive critical term. They use 
the didactic as one means of condemning the moral. John 
Crowe Ransom has placed himself in opposition to the idea 
that morality has a place in literary criticism; in The 
Intent of the Critic he writes:
Before I venture, with inadequate argument, 
v'~ to describe what I take to be the correct
understanding of poetry, I would like to de­
scribe two other understandings which, though
widely professed, seem to me misunderstandings. 
First, there is a smart and belletristic theory 
of poetry which may be called "psychologistic." 
Then there is also a staid and commonplace 
theory which is moralistic,1
And in The New Criticism he writes further: "It is like
according a moral dimension to poetry because there are
some poems which not only present their own content but
1The Intent of The Critic, ed. Donald A. Stauffer (Princeton, IWTT7 p. 94.
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in addition moralize about this content."
Ransom is against morality in literary criticism and 
he is preoccupied with the moral as the didactic; that is, 
the moral message, or the lesson to be learned. That Ran­
som sees the moral as didactic is more clear from a passage 
in The World* s Body:
And all the poets famous in our tradition, 
or very nearly all, have been of a powerful 
moral cast.
So I shall try a preliminary definition of 
the poet's traditional function on behalf of 
our society: he proposed to make virtue deli­
cious. He compounded a moral effect with an 
aesthetic effect. The total effect was not a 
pure one, but it was rich, and relished highly. 
The name of the moral effect was goodness; the
name of the aesthetic effect was beauty. Per­
haps these did not have to co-exist, but the 
planners of society saw to it that they should; 
they called upon the artist to reinforce moral­
ity with charm.3
We are aware that didacticism may be harmful to the 
work and the blunt didacticism which Ransom indicates is
oBvious to the reader: we are all familiar with the
"pictureless books in which small boys, though warned with 
quotations not to, would skate on Farmer Giles' pond and 
did and drowned."1* But surely Ransom does not think that
2
2John Crowe Ransom, The New Criticism (Norfolk,
Conn., 1941), p. 283.
3John Crowe Ransom, The World's Body (New York, 1938), p. 57.
4Dylan Thomas, "A Child's Christmas in Wales,-"-Quite 
Early One Morning (New York, 1955), p. 25.
anyone seriously interested in criticism wants to perpetu­
ate that kind of moral as an element of critical doctrine. 
His desire to wipe out an offensive quality leads him too 
far: there are other considerations-of morality in litera­
ture; and I suspect, moreover, that he is not thinking of 
all the poets famous in our tradition, but primarily of 
the Victorian poets. Another quote from a later section 
of The World * s _Body supports my suspicion: Ransom quotes
these lines from Pippa Passes:
The year's at the spring
And day's at the morn;
Morning's at seven;
The hill-side's dew-pearled;
The lark's on the wing;
The snail's on the thorn;
God's in his heaven—
All's right with world!
This, he says, "is a piece of transparent homiletics; for 
in it six pretty, coordinate images are marched, like six 
little lambs to the slaughter, to a colon and a powerful 
'text."5 The Victorians are notorious for their didacticism 
and Ransom has definitely hit upon a case of it; that was 
his intention. However, it seems to me that here a new 
possibility arises which we have not yet discussed: the
didactic may be useful. It has, in this poem, a specific 
purpose which converts it from an offensive didacticism to 
a functional element of the poem. The lines which Ransom 
finds particularly offensive are the concluding ones:
5The World's Body, p. 121.
"God’s in his heaven—  / All's right with the world!" Out 
of context, they result in the platitude which we recog­
nize as the moral lesson. But the song is part of a drama, 
and the dramatic situation exists in-the juxtaposition of 
the naive, innocent girl from the silk mills with the 
worldly evils which she skips by. The whole drama is an 
exercise in dramatic irony. Superficially, it is a fairy 
tale: as Pippa skips through the town of Asolo singing,
murderers repent, treachery is undone, and, having done 
her good deeds, Pippa skips home to her humble bed without 
knowing that she is an heiress. Pippa is a beautiful, 
romantic spirit whose world, about which she sings, is 
somewhat different from the world in which we live. It is 
clear that as Pippa sings, all is not right with the world; 
and at the end of her day, it is still not right. The body 
of Luca lies on the floor; the repentance of his murderers 
does not eradicate the crime; and the necessity of suicide 
for the lovers is a dubious good. The offerings given by 
the poor are being used by corrupt church officials to buy 
abductions and murders, and the wickedness of Jules’ school­
fellows in the attempt to injure his soul is not non­
existent because the plot was a failure. Pippa's world is 
a fairy's world and its stability is unreal— at best, 
fragile. The easy answer of the platitude is questioned 
by the poet himself. And the question is one of justice 
in the world. Pippa's song enforces the irony of the situ­
ation; if it protrudes from the work, it protrudes in a
14
functional artistic sense not as a platitude for the sake 
of the platitude.
The didactic may often appear as a functional 
element in literature. In Browning's-poem, it is func­
tional as a device to enforce dramatic irony; but it has 
other functional uses. It is sometimes used as a device 
for character development: Shakespeare's Polonius is a
classical example of its use in this manner. Ogden Nash 
uses the "plan of instruction" as a humorous device: 
many of his poems are poems with a "message" ludicrously 
presented. In the novel of social protest, the didactic 
appears in tone, a more subtle form of the didactic which 
is not so offensive as the platitude, for though it teaches, 
it teaches in a more comprehensive manner. It is signi­
ficant that the success of the didactic element in these 
instances depends upon our recognizing the didactic as 
"didactic." If we recognize the didactic when we meet it, 
we should have no trouble in deciding when it is being used 
effectively and when it is offensive. If we do not recog­
nize it, we are in danger of mistaking Polonius for a wise 
old man, and Nash's poem,
One would be in less danger 
From the wiles of the stranger 
If one's own kin and kith 
Were more fun to be with^
as simply a wise and serious observation.
Ogden Nash, "Family Court," Many Long Years Ago 
(Boston, 1945), p. 156.
The didactic may be negative in its effect on the 
literary art work as Ransom suggests. But it may also be 
a functional element, and it is a very slight moral con­
sideration to be dealt with,^among others.
II. Literary Criticism and the Function of 
Literature in the World
The didactic as a teaching device is closely re­
lated to our second consideration of morality in critical 
discussion: that is, the confusion of the function of
literature in the world with literary criticism. In the 
last analysis we might say that any function imposed on 
literary criticism is didactic, but the functions imposed 
on criticism are so varied that they deserve a separate 
treatment. There are those who would insist on a function­
al art, art which is of some instrumental value to society. 
This position is confusing and dangerous to accurate criti­
cal opinion because the critic may be duped into a false 
evaluation through his dogmatic adherence to his presupposed 
function.
Phillip Sidney, in his Defence of Poesie, sees the 
function of literature as essentially didactic. He in­
sists that the function of poetry is to instruct one in 
the virtues of the world. He indicates that it can serve 
this purpose more admirably and perform it more efficiently 
than history or philosophy because it provides the general 
truth which history does not provide (since history is
16
concerned with particular facts that have been recorded in
the world), and, moreover, that it incorporates the general
concepts of philosophy, so that one gets both history and
7philosophy at once. Presumably, that work which would not 
be instructive in the virtues of the world by conventionally 
accepted standards of virtue would not qualify as literary 
art.
The didactic is but one supposed function of litera­
ture in the world; there are many others given by philos- 
phers and critics from the age of Plato to the present time. 
Since many of us look to Plato for his comments on morality 
in art, it may be beneficial to begin with him. First, we 
must point out that Plato was primarily a philosopher not 
a critic; he was concerned with the nature of art in the 
world. From his conclusions about the nature of art, he 
(and many following him) determined what should be done 
with it. He concluded that art was three steps from the 
reality which he posited in his forms. The first form is 
the "idea” of an object, which is its ultimate reality (in 
The Republic, the object used for illustration is a bed).
The second form is the physical object in the world which 
represents the "idea" (the bed made by the carpenter). The 
third form is the imitation of the physical object by the 
artist (a painter's representation of a bed). He extends
7Phillip Sidney, A Defence of Poesie and Poems 
(New York, The Cassell Publishing Co., n.d.).
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the analogy of the painter's imitation to the poet, and 
concludes that poetry is illusory. The poet, he concludes, 
could lead one to the truth of the world, but his way would 
be a less sure way than the dialectic.of philosophical dis­
course. Poetry was therefore banished from the Republic, 
or the perfect state, unless it were to be directed by 
those who had arrived at the truth by reason. This, of 
course, would give a canon of art which would be moral in 
terms of the Platonic doctrine, but it would exclude some 
works which would still be art in terms of the aesthetic 
experience.
Leo Tolstoy, in his book What Is Art?, presents the 
classic confusion of the function of literature with liter­
ary criticism. Tolstoy conceived of literature (and all 
art) as a uniting power which would tie the bonds of 
brotherhood tighter. His faith in art to accomplish this 
end was magnificent and ambitious:
The task of art is enormous. Through the 
influence of real art, aided by science guided 
by religion, that peaceful co-operation of man 
which is now obtained by external means— by 
our law courts, police, charitable institutions, 
factory inspection, etc.— should be obtained by 
man's free and joyous activity. Art should 
cause violence to be set aside. . . . that 
same art can also evoke reverence for the dign­
ity of every man and for the life of every 
animal; can make men ashamed of luxury, of vio­
lence, of revenge, or of using for their plea­
sure that of which others are in need; can
^Plato, "The Republic," Book X, The Dialogues of 
Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York, 1937).
compel people freely, gladly and without 
noticing it, to sacrifice themselves in the 
service of man.^
But as a result of judging art in regard to how well it 
fulfilled a presupposed function, Tol§toy condemned the 
works of Shakespeare, Raphael and Beethoven, among many 
others, whom we feel to be not only artists, but among the 
sublime. The inaccuracy is apparent; it results from 
making art conform to the party policy.
Jean Paul Sartre, in an article entitled "The Case 
for Responsible Literature," has indicated that the function 
of the artist as it emerges in his art is that of leader in 
social and political affairs:
I hold Flaubert and Goncourt responsible for 
the repressions which followed the Commune, be­
cause they wrote not a single line to prevent 
them. It may be said that it was none of their 
business: but was the case of Calas the business
of Voltaire? the sentence of Dreyfus the business 
of Zola? the administration of the Congo the 
business of Gide? Each of these writers, in 
some particular circumstance of his life,
~ weighed up to his responsibility as a writer.
The occupation has taught us ours. Since by our 
very existence we influence our time, we must 
decide that the influence must be deliberate. 
. . .  it is our tasks as writers to cast light 
on the eternal values which are involved in these 
social and political disputes.10
Again, Sartre indicates a function of literature; but we
should observe, I think, that if this were used as the final
9Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art?, trans. Aylmer Maud 
(New York, 1960), pp. 189-190.
■^Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Case for Responsible''~Eitera- 
ture," Horizon, XI (February, 1945), 307-312.
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means of judgment as to whether or not a work was a work of 
literary art, we might find ourselves including Uncle Tom's 
Cabin and Hard Times and excluding Swann1s Way from our 
canon. *
Yvor Winters is a contemporary critic who is con­
cerned with morality in literature as a critical factor.
For Winters the final judgment of the literary work is a 
judgment in regard to the moral efficacy of the poem. He 
writes;
I believe, to be sure, that ethical interest 
is the only poetic interest, for the reason 
that all poetry deals with one kind or another 
of human experience and is valuable in propor­
tion to the justice with which it evaluates 
that experience
In an earlier volume, Primitivism and Decadence, Winters
had written;
Poetry, as a moral discipline, should not 
be regarded as one more means of escape. That 
is, moral responsibility should not be trans­
ferred from action to paper in the face of a 
particular situation. Poetry, if pursued 
either by the poet or reader, in the manner 
which I have suggested, should offer a means of 
enriching one's awareness of human experience 
and of so rendering greater the possibility of 
intelligence in the course of future action; 
and it should offer likewise a means of in­
ducing certain more or less constant habits of 
feeling, which should render greater the possi­
bility of one's actions, in a future situation, 
in accordance with the findings of one's im­
proved intelligence. It should, in other words, 
increase the intelligence and strengthen the 
moral temper; these effects should naturally 
be carried over into action, if, through con­
stant discipline, they are made permanent ac­quis it ions. 12 ^
l^Yvor Winters, The Defense of Reason (New York. 1947), p. 505. -------------------
f pp. 28-29.
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Winters' plea for a moral effect on the reader, which he 
uses as a means of evaluation, and the plea for action in 
a future situation, which is to be based on the aesthetic 
experience, are not the concern of the literary critic; 
they may be of interest to the sociologist, the psycholo­
gist or the aesthetician. Winters too commits the error 
of confusing the function of literature with critical doc­
trine. His confusion accounts for his severe treatment of 
the romantic poets and in many cases for his sub-standard 
evaluations.13
There are other points of view, certainly, which 
will illustrate the confusion of function with literary 
criticism: Shelley saw art as a means of increasing one's
sensitivity and thereby enlarging his sympathy for his 
fellow man;11* and William Faulkner, in his acceptance 
speech for the Nobel Prize awarded to him in 1950, made a 
comment about literature which might easily be converted 
into this confusion if applied to criticism, for his speech 
concerned the function of literature:
It is his [the writer's] privilege to help 
man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding 
him of the courage and honor and hope and pride
13See Stanley Edgar Hyman's The Armed Vision for 
a discussion of Winters' critical judgments.
14Percy B. Shelley, "A Defence of Poetry," Shelley's 
Defence of Poetry; Browning's Essay on Shelley, ed. L. 
Winstanley (Boston, 1911)7
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and compassion and pity and sacrifice which 
have been the glory of his past.-*-5
Many literary works, of course, do not fulfill such a
noble function. 1
Perhaps the greatest criticism of the humanistic 
doctrine of Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt is that 
they were not concerned so much with literature as art as 
they were with its effects on the world. Norman Foerster 
has pointed this error out in his essay in The Intent of 
the Critic:
More and Babbitt were general critics. They 
were convinced that there was nearly everything 
wrong with modern civilization. Living in a 
time of complacent naturalism, when the idea of 
progress promised a Utopia, and science a method 
for attaining it, they made themselves unpopular 
by asserting that such a deluded program could 
only lead to the destruction of our civilization. 
To others, such as the socialists, who saw some­
thing fundamentally wrong with our civilization 
but who sought a remedy in a new economic system, 
they replied that the higher issues must be faced 
before the lower, since "the economic problem 
will be found to run into the political problem 
and the political problem in turn into the phil­
osophical problem, and the philosophical problem 
itself to be almost indisolubly bound up at last 
with the religious problem." Believing that 
our civilization had gone wrong on first prin­
ciples, they were not content to be literary 
critics; they were general critics, and finally 
religious critics.
15 . .William Faulkner, "Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech," 
The Faulkner Reader: Selections from the Works of WilliamFaulkner (New York, 1954), p. 4.
1SThe Intent of the Critic, p. 78.
22
Those who are in favor of an autonomous art are also 
concerned with the function of art in the world. They often 
become involved with the nature of beauty and in determining 
what beauty is they impose a function .upon art— it should 
be beautiful. William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks 
in their book Literary Criticism: A Short History, have
pointed out the fallacy of this point of view (as it con­
cerns criticism) in their discussion of the Kantian doc­
trine of "purposiveness without purpose." The doctrine is 
inadequate for literary criticism for the upshot of it is:
Kant's idea of beauty was severe; it re­
lated (so far as human making was concerned) 
almost exclusively to the formal, decorative, 
and abstract; to Greek designs, foliation on 
wallpaper, arabesques (things which "mean 
nothing in themselves"), music without words.
The "charms" of direct sensuous pleasure might 
fuse with beauty, and beauty might be combined 
with perfect natural forms and purposive human 
artifacts (the good, the ideal), but in neither 
of these cases was beauty pure. Beauty allied 
to the good was no "free beauty" (pulchritudo 
vaga) but dependent beauty (pulchritudo ad- 
"v'—• haerens). The two might help us by being to­
gether, but strictly speaking neither helped 
the other. It is worth noting that here was 
a system which conceived Homer and Shakespeare 
as less aesthetically pure than wallpaper.
Benedetto Croce is a philosopher who is also con­
cerned with the function of art in the world. Croce does 
not impose function on criticism of the art work but his 
function prevents any analytical discussion. For Croce, 
the function of art is cognition; and it is the basic form
17William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, 
Literary Criticism: A Short History (New York, 1959),
p . 372.
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of cognition which comes before any other form of know­
ledge— intuition. The "pure aesthetic" or intuition is, 
in Croce's terms, undefinable. Pure art is the internal
expression of the artist (the -intuition in the artist's 
18mind). However, we as critics are concerned with the 
external art object, not with the philosophical definition 
of the aesthetic experience. Certainly it "is," but we 
live in the practical world as well as the contemplative 
or theoretical in which Croce's "pure aesthetic" exists; 
and if we are to assume the role of critics, we cannot 
escape criticism as a practical activity. The purity of 
Croce's art is not very helpful to the critic who must deal 
with the art object.
It is obvious to all who have had any commerce with 
literature that a work is not to be equated to morality or 
any other abstraction from the work, any more than poetry 
is to be equated with meter. We realize that we cannot 
abstract from the work and hope to do it justice in terms 
of that one abstraction. The work of art is complete only 
in itself; it is a unique and unified whole which we recog­
nize as such. But we have presupposed that criticism is a 
useful activity, that it can help us to perceive excellences 
in the work; and we agree that it is an analytical process 
in which we may abstract for the sake of utility in order
18 -_r^-Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic As Science of Expression
and General Linguistic, trans. Douglas Ainslie Wew York,
1960).
24
to say something about the work. In the analytical pro­
cess, criticism becomes a matter of determining what is 
relevant to analysis and not a matter of adamantly dis­
couraging critical discussion $s taboo. Once again, as 
when a function of literature is imposed on criticism, we 
find that the philosopher may not be helpful to the critic, 
for each has different goals. In addition to the functions 
of literature indicated above, T. S. Eliot, in "The Social 
Function of Poetry," and John Dewey, in Art As Experience, 
have indicated the functions of poetry and the other arts 
as elements of primitive religious rites. All of these 
functions may be possible for literature, for we know that 
art can reach the hearts of men of disparate religions, 
races, and ideologies where other means fail, and may, in 
that sense bring them closer together. We also feel that 
art is instructive in some sense (that it is cognitive), 
that it may offer spiritual strength to help man endure
v** ^
and that it may be influential socially. But we must be 
careful not to apply these functions to the process of 
criticism as a measuring device to determine art and non- 
art. To determine the value of art in terms of one parti­
cular function out of the many possible is unfair. We can­
not insist that art conform to a particular function. The 
concern of the literary critic is not with the implications 
of literature but with the literature itself. We must 
exclude the functions of literature from literary criti­
cism because there are numerous functions and because the
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judgments of fulfillment must necessarily be subjective. 
Sidney Zink has indicated the fallacy of subjective judg­
ment in his article on moral effect:
Art may serve to i’emove excess emotion and 
quell riotous desires, or it'may arouse emotion 
and inflame desire. And there are records of 
both criminal and humanitarian actions which 
have— according to the "appreciators" confes­
sions— resulted from the appreciation of a work 
of art.
This puts the matter on the basis of fact; 
and if it were to be settled in this way we 
should need a corps of sociologists to conduct 
a survey and determine whether the vicious or 
the virtuous results predominate. The philos­
opher, however, can reject this method on the 
ground that the statistician cannot determine 
whether the contact with art (which is followed 
by virtue or vice) is an aesthetic contact.1
The arguments in criticism concerning form and con­
tent arise from the confusion of the function of art with 
literary criticism. The critic concerned with function 
will obviously be concerned with content; for him, the kind*
of content may determine the excellence of the work. But 
the objective critic insists that content cannot determine 
literary excellence. In his essay "The Frontiers of Criti­
cism," T. S. Eliot has indicated that the literary critic 
must not go beyond certain limits if he wishes to keep his 
criticism strictly literary:
The difference, then, between the literary 
critic who has passed beyond the frontier of 
literary criticism, is not that the literary 
critic is ’purely* literary, or that he has no 
other interests. . . . The critic . . .  is a
■^ Zink.
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literary critic if his primary interest, in 
writing criticism, is to help his readers to 
understand and enjoy. But he must have other 
interests, just as much as the poet himself; 
for the literary critic is not merely a techni­
cal expert, who has learned the rules to be 
observed by the writers he criticizes: the
critic must be the whole man, a man with con­
victions and principles, and of knowledge and 
experience of life.
We can therefore ask, about any writing 
which is offered as literary criticism, is it 
aimed towards understanding and enjoyment? If 
it is not, it may still be a legitimate and 
useful activity; but it is to be judged as a 
contribution to psychology, or sociology, or 
logic, or pedagogy, or some other pursuit—  
and is to be judged by specialists, not by 
men of letters.2 0
^T. S. Eliot, "The Frontiers of Criticism," On 
Poetry and Poets (London, 1957), pp. 116-117.
tCHAPTER TWO 
THE MORAL ATTITUDE AS A CRITICAL FACTOR
We have identified two aspects of morality in 
literary discussion, and have determined the relation of 
each .to literary criticism. The first aspect, the didac­
tic element, is one which, in its most offensive form, pro­
trudes from the work. But if it is structurally function­
al, as it sometimes may be, it is no longer offensive as 
an instructional device. Its relation to morality is 
slight and it is chiefly useful as a negative critical
term. There is also the aspect which we have designated
"functional in the world": that is, art may function in
'a- moral sense in so far as it has a moral effect on society 
or the individual; but the critic will not be concerned 
with that element of morality in literature if he wishes 
to keep criticism objective. There may be several func­
tions of art in the world, but, as we have seen, the im­
position of the function of art as a measuring device to
determine art and non-art may lead to a dogmatism which 
will be entirely unfair to the work. The error of im­
posing function on critical doctrine is the most dangerous 
and the most widespread of the two general errors which we
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have discussed. So far, morality as it concerns the art 
work has been shown to be extra-aesthetic. It is external 
to the objective analysis of the art work. We have also 
indicated that the philosophi<?al approach to art may not 
be helpful to the critic and that morality may have a 
place in literary criticism if it is relevant to the ob­
jective analysis of the work. There is an aspect of 
morality which is not external and may be of use as a 
critical term and that is the moral attitude as it appears 
in the dramatic conflict.
We know that dramatic context can be important to 
the form of the literary art work. As Cleanth Brooks and 
Robert Penn Warren have pointed out in their article "The 
Reading of Modern Poetry":
The word never seems, to say the least, 
fairly colorless and negative. To repeat it 
five times in succession does not on logical 
grounds add to its poetic efficacy. However, 
on psychological grounds, the repetition, when 
placed in the mouth of Lear in Shakespeare's 
play, becomes extremely poetic. Obviously, 
the poetic force is derived from the dramatic context.!
The context, xn a sense, dictates the form. If the words 
of King Lear were placed in the mouth of Volpone when he 
discovers that all of his worldly possessions are lost, 
they would still be in dramatic context, they would still 
be enriched by a psychological ground, and we might feel
1Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, "The Reading 
of Modern Poetry," American Review, VIII (1937), 435-449.
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them to be pathetic; but the poetry would be lost. Or, if 
they were given to the Wife of Bath as her reply to a com­
panion who had told her that she should never have another 
lover, we might feel them to fce comic-words; but the poetry 
would be lost. The words depend on the complex and parti­
cular context of King Lear for their poetic quality.
We are concerned not only with the dramatic context 
but with dramatic conflict as it arises in the context.
Iri thexr book Understanding Fiction, Brooks and Warren 
write more specifically about conflict:
In its [conflict's} most obvious form it 
concerns a collision of interests in the ex­
ternal world. In a somewhat more subtle and 
sophisticated form conflict concerns a division 
of interests or obligations in the self. In 
an even more subtle and sophisticated form, it 
concerns the alignment of judgments and sym­
pathies on the part of the author— the problem 
of his own self-division.
The dogmatist who is author paints a world 
of black and white, a world in which right and 
wrong, truth and falsehood, are clear with 
' x'* statutory distinctness, a world of villain and
hero.^ The artist who is author paints a world 
in which there is, in the beginning, neither 
black nor white, neither right nor wrong, which 
can be defined with absolute certainty. The 
certainty can come only in terms of the pro­
cess, and must be earned, as it were, through the process.2
Conflict does not, of course, necessarily mean moral 
conflict (which is our concern); there may be conflict in 
a dramatized poker game, a prize fight or a romance; but
. . Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, UnderstandingFiction (New York, 1946), p. xvii. ---------- &
Brooks and Warren realize the importance of the moral
decision in terms of literary conflict. They have a special 
term for it— irony:
Most popular fic*tion aims at flattering the 
ethical sense of the public. That such fiction 
is often, in the last analysis, corrupt derives 
from the fact that the author does not under­
stand the necessity of attempting to realize 
the idea fully in the experience of his charac­
ters and in the structure of his story. The
villain bites the dust; the good heart triumphs 
over all. The author does not recognize the 
difficulty, let us say, in making a moral de­
cision, and simply follows the idea as blue­
print, as dogma. Situations which qualify an 
idea of virtue and emphasize the difficulty of 
moral decision . . .  do not flourish in the 
fiction of our best family magazines. Such 
fiction is deficient in irony.3
In the above passages, Brooks and Warren indicate generally 
what Sidney Zink has called the moral attitude. The differ­
ence is that Zink’s definition is more precise about the
moral situation; he has defined it for us. Using his
terminology in the above passage, we might just as well 
Tfave said that corrupt fiction is deficient in morality; 
for Zink’s moral attitude is_ conflict— conflict in which 
the human agent is forced into questioning his knowledge 
about the good. It is conflict which will "qualify an idea 
of virtue" through conscientious pursuit.
Using the two points of view, let us examine the 
drama of King Lear as an example of the full realization 
of the moral conflict in literature.
Understanding Fiction, p. xvi.3
That King Lear is a drama developed along moral 
grounds seems obvious. Many critics have agreed on this 
point, as Oscar J. Campbell has pointed out in his article 
entitled "The Salvation of Lear." Campbell says: "The
Tragedy of King Lear moves to its catastrophe on a higher 
plane than any other of Shakespeare's tragedies. Most 
critics have sensed its wider moral range and its greater 
sublimity*"1* The wider moral range of which Professor 
Campbell speaks is the comprehensive expression of the moral 
attitude. We are faced with numerous choices between good 
and evil in the drama and the choices and their implications 
constitute the moral attitude. We are introduced immediate­
ly to a moral situation as the play begins. The first scene 
opens with the Earl of Gloucester talking to the Earl of 
Kent. Edmund, the bastard son of Gloucester, is present. 
Gloucester displays at once a questionable moral judgment 
through his treatment of Edmund. That Edmund was conceived 
out of wedlock and in an adulterous situation is Gloucester's 
initial moral error by traditional moral standards. But in 
the conversation with Kent, the "fault" is compounded and 
Edmund must take the brunt of Gloucester's vulgar jest, 
Gloucester casts a slur upon Edmund's mother, and Edmund 
is introduced to Kent as "the whoreson" who "must be ac­
knowledged" and whose only recommendations are that his
Oscar J. Campbell, "The Salvation of Lear," ”ELH, XV (1948), 93-109. * -- *
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mother was fair and that "there was good sport at his 
making" (I,i.23-25). There is no individual praise given, 
there is no dignity, there is no respect left for Edmund 
after his father's little jest, Gloucester has his joke at 
Edmund's expense. The first conflict is set in progress 
(Gloucester's actions will have moral repercussions on 
Edmund). The second follows upon Lear's entrance and 
Gloucester's exist. King Lear is to set the stage for his 
"darker purpose."
Lear is going to play a little game, much as Glou­
cester has done; and, like Gloucester's game, Lear's will 
proceed at the expense of others and for the glorification 
of himself. Lear sets up a contest in which his daughters 
are to compete for the lands of England which are to be 
awarded as their dowries. Each daughter is to perform; 
and each is to receive her prize, ostensibly, as a result 
of her performance. The price to be paid for competition 
is humility toward the king and the public display of 
voiced filial love. Lear has instigated a basically evil 
situation. Not only is he offending the legitimate pride 
of self-respect, but he is assuming that his daughters, 
whether they love him or not, will prostitute their integrity 
to obtain the prizes. In setting up the awards on a com­
petitive basis, he is assuming that material goods can buy 
ideal values. Moreover, one must not forget that the whole 
plan is provoked under false pretenses, because Lear’has 
already divided his kingdom before the contest begins; and
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he has given Cordelia the "most opulent third." Lear takes 
pleasure in this diabolical scheme.
The immediate repercussions of this situation are on 
Goneril, Regan, Kent and Cordelia. If Goneril and Regan 
were to receive their awards according to the real love 
they bear their father, they would receive precious little; 
so the truth of their loves will not be voiced. They make 
their choices in favor of hypocrisy and deceit in order to 
obtain the lands. Lear is satisfied with their reactions; 
their choices are good because they satisfy his vanity. 
Cordelia's answer, however, shakes the unstable structure 
of the evil situation which Lear has engendered. Kent's 
intercession on behalf of Cordelia only serves to annoy 
Lear. The structure of his game has collapsed, leaving 
him again with a basic ethical choice between good and evil. 
He must either admit the evil of his scheme by the recogni­
tion of the truth of Cordelia's words and thus cloak himself 
with the garment of shame publicly, or he must ignore the 
hypocrisy of Goneril and Regan and uphold his evil design, 
which will result in the banishment of Cordelia and Kent.
He is the king, he is the image of authority and respect, 
and since he has stood behind evil in the inception of an 
evil situation, he must maintain his right to do so. He 
compounds his original error by backing up the evil pre­
cipitated by his design. The error is not only the result 
of his necessity of upholding his authority, however; it 
is Lear's human error. The conflict is a personal one and
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Lear himself exposes its personal nature. In his rage at 
Cordelia following her refusal to perform, he drops the 
plural of majesty as he says, "Better thou / Hadst not been 
born than not t1 have pleased-pe better" (I.i.37-38). Lear 
has accused Kent and Cordelia of pride, which is tradition­
ally the greatest of sins. He has said of Cordelia, "Let 
pride, which she calls plainness, marry her" (I.i.131), and 
to Kents "Thou hast sought to make us break our vows, / 
Which we durst never yet, and with strain'd pride / To come 
betwixt our sentence and our power" (I.i.171-173). We are 
quick to espy Lear's folly and Shakespeare's irony, for 
Lear has been one of the finest of Pride's victims.
At this point in the drama, the moral conflict has 
been set up for the rest of the play. Lear has made his 
choice concerning his most loved daughter, His daughters 
have made their choices in regard to him, and the Gloucester 
subplot, of the actions of the father versus the actions of 
the children, has been set up to emphasize the Lear con­
flict, Complexity of situation and complexity of charac­
ter begin to emerge. We begin to sense the irony which 
Brooks and Warren have suggested. There is a collision of 
interests in the external world: Lear loves Cordelia but
will not injure his own pride to save her; Cordelia loves 
her father but will not abandon her self-respect to flatter 
his vanity, Kent intercedes on Cordelia's behalf because 
he fears an injustice is being done and because he fears 
for the well being of the king and the kingdom if Lear goes
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through with his plan, but Kent too loves Lear. Goneril 
and Regan deceive the king and turn upon their sister for 
their own personal gains. There is also a division of 
interests and obligations in ttie selves of Lear, Cordelia 
and Kent. And, as we continue in the drama, we shall see 
that even at this point there is no all black and all white 
division offered by the author. The conflict has been set 
up; its working out and its resolution will illustrate what 
Brooks and Warren mean by the realization of the idea fully 
in the experiences of the characters, and, more especially, 
what Zink means by the conscientious pursuit of the right 
solution to a moral problem.
Kent and Cordelia have chosen the system of honesty 
as the best policy and have therefore done the right thing 
in traditional terms. However, Cordelia too is somewhat 
at fault for the initial conflict. She upholds her integrity 
at Lear's expense. One cannot feel that Cordelia should 
have knelt at her father's knees in the obsequious and 
deceitful manner of Goneril and Regan. Nor does one feel 
that Cordelia should have humored her father because of his 
old age; but surely her answers appear too brutal. She 
could have declined to perform more graciously and with 
more humility than her speeches indicate. She says, "I 
love your majesty / According to my bond; no more nor less" 
(I.i.9H-95), And further: "Haply, when I shall wed, /
That lord whose hand must take my plight shall carryHalf 
my love with him, half my care and duty. / Sure, I shall
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never marry like my sisters/ [To love my father all]"
(I.i.102-106). These speeches are clipped and cold; it 
seems unnecessary that she should throw this kind of inform­
ation to an aged father to digest as he will. Such speeches
smack of Cordelia's pride; she would have done better had
she kept her resolution to "Love and be silent" (I.i.63),
One might also question Kent's right under any cir­
cumstances to repeatedly interrupt the king in public, to 
tell him that he is mad, to call him a bower to flattery 
and a rash and foolish old man. He too makes it harder 
for the king to back down from his decision; the pressure 
on Lear becomes intense.
The variations and complications of the moral choices 
increase as the play continues. The minor characters com­
plicate the moral situation: the Fool, though sick at
heart over the wrong done to Cordelia, is loyal to Lear; 
the impertinent Oswald maintains a certain curious loyalty'w"v*
to his evil mistress; Lear's knights are bought off by 
those in power; and Cornwall's servant, offended by a gross­
ly evil action, makes a moral decision which costs him his 
life.
Throughout the rest of the play, Lear suffers great­
ly; he goes through a grueling process of self-examination 
and evaluation. It would be absurd to attempt a thorough 
explication of the play on moral grounds, for it is too 
complex; the possibilities of choice become immense"as the 
play progresses. But we do see Lear attempting to cope
37
with the evil in the world and approaching the examination 
of himself in various ways. We see him first as a power­
less king, arrogant, insisting upon his due regard from his 
former subjects and his daughters; we .see him in impotent 
rage at the worldly elements and at his ungrateful daughters; 
we see him come to the existential question of man in his 
speech to "poor Tom" on the heath in which he asks:
Is man no more than this? Consider him well. 
Thou ow'st the worm no silk, the beast no hide, 
the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. Ha!
_ here's three on's are sophisticated! Thou art
the thing itself; unaccommodated man is no more 
but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou 
art (III.iv.107-114).
And we see him in a state of delirium before he finally 
comes to terms with Cordelia and the world. All of this 
is the "pursuit" of the right solution; or as Brooks and 
Warren would say, it is the process through which the cer­
tainty of the solution must be earned.
But we have only given an indication of the pursuit; 
what kind of solution do we have in the play? And what is 
so good about earning it? After all, both Lear and Cordelia 
die; therefore we might naively assume that Lear has earned 
a rather dubious good. Why could we not have a happy ending 
as was given in an earlier version of the play (The True 
Chronicle History of King Leir)? In that play, Lear regains 
his throne and Cordelia is taken back to his heart to be 
cherished. The implication in that case is that Cordelia's 
hard maintained virtue is rewarded. We would then have a 
pointedly didactic play in which, while the didactic would
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not ruin the play entirely, we would feel that the stature 
of the play had been diminished greatly. We would consider 
the intrusion of the didactic a serious artistic error.
But why are we so offended by*the didactic? Certainly we 
feel that Lear has suffered enough and that he deserves 
some happiness at the end of the play; why then do we feel 
that it is "right" for him and Cordelia to die? The point 
is that the ending of the play is a "happy" one as it stands. 
First of all, we must remember that it is Lear's play and 
not Cordelia's. If we permit the didactic ending for the 
play, the emphasis will be on the actions of Cordelia and 
we do not want that. A network of moral conflict emerges 
from Lear's actions; it expands outwardly from Lear and in 
turn, Lear finds himself enmeshed and bound by the conflicts 
which he has engendered. The initial and subsidiary con­
flicts converge upon him; he is the focal point of the moral 
question and he must come to terms with it. Cordelia is 
Lear's means for coming to terms with his problem of evil 
in the world. Lear has made his choices, he has suffered, 
he has regained Cordelia and has come to some understanding 
of the world; ironically, he must lose her to gain complete 
happiness— to reach the "right" solution. The theme of King 
Lear is an ideal one: that is, it is concerned with the
ideal values of good and evil— it is an examination of those 
values. If Lear's triumph over the factors of evil is to be 
valid, it must also be ideal. If the play is given the 
didactic ending, the ideal values will be sold out for
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material gains, the material, earthly happiness of the 
didactic version. We gravely feel the superficiality of 
that solution as a split in the thematic unity of the work. 
The conscientiousness of pursuit is thrown over for the 
ease of the immediate and tangible solution. Lear's gain 
must be greater and more lasting than that. It is through 
Cordelia's death that Lear realizes the reality of Cordelia's 
love which is immune to death; and with his heart full of 
love for her, Lear dies. Lear has come to an understanding 
of the values of good in the world which cannot be had 
cheap; and upon the realization of these values, he is 
ready to die—1‘ripeness is all."
Theme, of course, involves action. If the theme is 
completed with Lear's death and the death of Cordelia, 
there will be a clean finality of action in that resolution. 
The didactic ending will also provide a resolution for the 
drama, but the resolution will come through the deus ex 
machina. It would be an admission on the part of the author 
that he could not handle the theme which he had chosen, that 
the theme had somehow got away from him and that he needed 
help from outside of the drama. The action would be arti­
ficially ended and we would feel the rupture of this con­
cession as we felt the concession in the case of theme.
The credibility of the play would be strained; it would 
make a fairy tale of the drama which the confines of the 
theme will not permit.
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The characters of Cordelia and Lear would of course 
be greatly damaged; they would shrink beyond recognition of 
the Lear and Cordelia we know, Lear would become simply an 
impetuous old man who made a aerious mistake, was punished 
rather severely, and, in turn, was rewarded for his re­
pentance, instead of the gigantic and powerful figure that 
he is. Cordelia would become a sort of royal Cinderella 
rewarded for her virtue, instead of the noble self-sacri­
ficing heroine who needs no reward.
The didactic is certainly inadequate for Shakespeare's 
play. We may say that the theme which Shakespeare has 
chosen is a moral one which demands the specific treatment 
of the moral attitude. The moral attitude will dictate the 
actions of the characters of the play to shape the form of 
the whole drama along the moral lines of Zink's definition.
By looking at the results of the didactic ending for King 
Lear, we can see some of the faults which result when an 
incident which demands a moral treatment does not meet the 
demand.
We are all familiar with the corrupt fiction of which 
Brooks and Warren write, in which the hero triumphs and the 
villain bites the dust. It is true that such fiction ap­
pears in the family magazines, as it does in our western 
novels and "true romances." It is not a new corruption 
however; we can find it in immature English fiction— in 
Pamela or the eighteenth-century romance, such as the 
Castle of Otranto, in which the choices of the protagonist
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are only superficially difficult and in which we can depend 
on the protagonist to make the conventionally right choice 
to triumph over evil in the world. We recognize these 
novels as immature and the "Westerns" .as corrupt. But some 
novels illustrate this corruption in a different way. 
Theodore Dreiser's novel Sister Carrie may help to illus­
trate the importance of the moral conflict to a fictional 
work although the theme which Dreiser has chosen is not a 
moral one. In his novel, Dreiser is concerned with morality 
in society; but it is his thesis that his heroine, Caroline 
Meeber, is not responsible for her actions because she is 
not capable of making a moral choice. Her actions, says 
Dreiser, are amoral. Carrie is very much like an animal; 
she has only biological drives— she has no control of her 
will. The only conflict for Carrie is one which concerns 
material goods. She is very much like the psychologist's 
rat looking for hidden cheese in a maze: only the possi-
bility of material gains directs Carrie in her choices.
At the beginning of the novel, we see Carrie placed 
in a situation of conventional moral conflict: she must
defy conventional morality to live with Drouet, or she must 
suffer the physical discomforts of the world if she does 
not. She chooses to live with Drouet. From this point on 
in the novel, Carrie has several chances to make moral 
choices: she must choose whether she will betray Drouet
for the affections of Hurstwood and the higher social class 
which he represents, and later she must choose whether she
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will betray the outcast Hurstwood for a chance for fame.
In both cases she leaves her lover and in neither case does 
she show any loyalty or responsibility to the lover she has 
left. Her lovers become mateaial burdens for her:
Her need of clothes— to say nothing of her 
desire for ornaments— grew rapidly as the fact 
developed that for all her work she was not to 
have them. The sympathy she felt for Hurst­
wood at the time he asked her to tide him over, 
vanished with these newer urgings of decency.
He was not always renewing his request, but 
this love of good appearance was. It insisted, 
and Carrie wished to satisfy it, wished more and 
. more that Hurstwood was not in the way,5
But Carrie's actions are without reflection; she does not
deliberately intend her actions; she acts by instinct and
her actions are therefore without moral quality.
The most interesting figure in the novel is Hurst­
wood. And he is interesting precisely because he gets in­
volved in ethical conflict (if only slightly). Dreiser 
gives Hurstwood a bit more freedom than Carrie, but he tries 
'‘ter explain part of his actions in terms of naturalistic 
forces. He tries to explain his actions in terms of environ­
ment, circumstance, and biological "chemisms of the brain"; 
nevertheless, Hurstwood goes through the motions of con­
flict. Hurstwood's wife is a cold, jealous and selfish 
woman and his children are indifferent to him as long as 
he provides them with money; he has adequate motivation for 
his initial error, his affair with Carrie, and he is carried
^Theodore Dreiser, Sister Carrie (New York, 1958),
p, 310,
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along by his fascination for a young girl until he comes to 
the point where he is about to steal the money from his em­
ployer. At that point, he becomes involved in conflict:
"The safe is opam," said a voice. "There is 
just the least little crack in it. The lock has 
not been sprung."
The manager floundered among a jumble of 
thoughts. Now all the entanglement of the day 
came back. Also the thought that here was a 
solution. That money would do it. If he had 
that and Carrie. He rose up and stood stock­
still looking at the floor.
— . "What about it?" his mind asked, and for
answer he put his hand slowly up and scratched 
his head.
The manager was no fool to be led blindly 
away by such a proposition as this, but his 
situation was peculiar. . . .  He went back to 
the safe and put his hand on the knob. Then he 
pulled the door open and took the drawer with 
the money quite out. . . .  He took the box and 
the money and put it back in the safe. Then he 
partly closed the door again. . . .  He strolled 
up to his little room, then to the door, then to 
the safe again. He put his hand on the knob and 
opened it. There was the money! Surely no harm 
could come from looking at it!°
V ^
Hurstwood wavers back and forth several times before he 
takes the money. Later, after he and Carrie have fled to 
Canada, the pressure of being a thief becomes too much for 
him, and he sends most of the money back to his employer. 
Hurstwood and Carrie leave Canada and go to New York and he 
tries to rebuild his life but he has no money and he has 
lost all of his former connections. He buys a small busi­
ness but is forced to sell it; he does not have enough money
6Sister Carrie, pp. 210-211.
to begin again. As Hurstwood's fortune declines, he begins 
to look at the world around him. He is struck by the hard­
ships of the people in the city:
Winter was coming, the papers were announcing 
hardships, and there was a general feeling of 
hard times in the air, or, at least, he thought 
so. In his worry, other people's worries became 
apparent. No item about a firm failing, a 
family starving, or a man dying upon the streets, 
supposedly of starvation, but arrested his eye 
as he scanned the morning papers. Once the 
"World” came out with a flaring announcement 
about "80,000 people out of employment in New
York this winter," which struck as a knife at
his heart.7
He becomes concerned about his being a burden to 
Carrie: "He had worked so hard to make expenses seem
light. He had been 'doing' butcher and baker in order not 
to call on her. He had eaten very little— almost nothing" 
(p. 324). Hurstwood's situation becomes steadily worse.
He tries to get a job as a trolley driver during the strike 
but his job is brought to an end as someone in the mob fires
a' shot which cuts his shoulder. He gets a job as a janitor
but comes down with pneumonia. He is finally reduced to 
begging for a living but he is not satisfied to beg just to 
exist: he commits suicide. Perhaps Hurstwood's moral con­
flicts are slight, since Dreiser attempts to explain his 
actions on naturalistic grounds, but they are nevertheless 
conflicts and his resulting actions are conscious ones. He 
is not entirely moved by the wills of the gods as Carrie is.
7 .Sister Carrie, pp. 268-269.
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As a result of his conflicts, he begins to emerge as a fully 
developed character. It is his ethical conflict which makes 
Hurstwood stand out, just as it accounts for the grand 
character of Lear and the excellence qf Cordelia and the 
Fool as literary characters. Slight as his conflict is, it 
puts him above the flat dull character of Carrie. One 
might also contrast the weakness of Carrie's character to 
the dynamic character of Hawthorne's Hester Prynne in The 
Scarlet Letter to indicate the difference between the char­
acter involved in moral conflict and the character who re­
mains unable to make an ethical choice. Hester's initial 
moral error is very much like Carrie's but as Richard B. 
Sewall has pointed out in his Vision of Tragedy:
The essence of Hester's seven-year course 
is conflict— of Hester with her self, her 
society, and her God. The conflict throughout 
is fraught with ambiguity, with goods and bads 
inextricably mixed, and constantly and bitterly 
recognized as such by Hester.®
We cannot accuse Dreiser of a failure to use the 
moral attitude as an artistic device in writing his novel, 
because the theme he has chosen is not a moral one; his 
attempt is to present an amoral situation. But it is 
curious that his most interesting character is interesting 
because he is involved in moral conflict.
We have examined King Lear as a work which repre­
sents a comprehensive view of the moral conflict and the
8Richard B. Sewall, The Vision of Tragedy (New Haven, 
Conn., 1959), p. 88.
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moral attitude; we have suggested that the didactic version 
of Lear, as well as much of our modern fiction, would 
represent a corrupt or inadequate fiction because it would 
not realize the importance of the moral conflict to a dra­
matic situation; and in Sister Carrie we have indicated the 
effect of moral conflict on character development. Although 
Dreiser's novel does not treat a moral theme as we have de­
fined it, Hurstwood goes beyond the naturalistic limits of 
the novel. But obviously all fiction and drama does not 
deal with moral themes or moral conflict; we do have 
excellent literary works which appear to be moral in theme 
and yet do not illustrate the "conscientious pursuit of the 
right solution," as we have said they must. What can we 
say of such works as Jonson's Volpone, or The Alchemist, or 
Joyce's Ulysses? Do not these works present a moral theme 
also? These are works which we call comedies, and as 
comedies they have certain characteristics which set them 
apart from the works which we have been discussing. Berg­
son and Zink have supplied us with a useful distinction:
Comedy, dealing (as Bergson has shown) with 
the type rather than the individual, exposes 
character instead of analyzing it, and, conform­
ably to its more superficial treatment, has an 
effect more momentary and faint. It presents 
human foibles, not human crimes: it discloses
conflicts which are social and remediable rather 
than psychical and universal. Thus its affini­
ties are to sociology more than to morality, and 
it is more capable of generating a social con­
sciousness than a moral conscience.9
Z^ink.
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In King Lear, we are involved with a drama of individual 
struggle and individual triumph and defeat. We deal with 
particular characters and particular struggles, but the 
implications are universal. Vjolpone is a general indict­
ment of society for its avarice and greed. Volpone feeds 
on the weaknesses of society, avarice, greed and lechery, 
which are typified by Corbaccio, Corvino and Voltore, The 
implications are social not individual. On a more modern 
level, we might examine James Joyce's Ulysses as an indict­
ment of society for its weaknesses. There is no particular 
or individual moral conflict in Ulysses; and, for those 
reasons, I call it comedy. We are faced with the general 
foibles of man in his society. We are not concerned with 
the individual and his struggle in the world. But let us 
look briefly at Ulysses (and the protagonist of the novel, 
Leopold Bloom) to determine its characteristics.
The information compiled and presented to the reader 
about Leopold Bloom, the hero of Ulysses, is astounding. 
There is an elaborate dialectical approach to his character. 
In the course of Bloomsday, we learn that Mr. Bloom has a 
particular liking for the finely scented taste of urine in 
a mutton kidney; that he likes to read while making his 
morning call to the toilet; that he has a certain amount of 
compassion for prostitutes, the blind, women in labor, and 
sea gulls; that he is interested in the notions of science 
(parallax in particular); that his son died shortly‘after 
birth; and that he is preoccupied with thoughts of his
wife's infidelity. These are but a few of the varied and 
innumerable facts given to the reader about Leopold Bloom.
It would seem, from the sheer weight of the facts 
given, that Bloom is the most completely drawn character 
in literary history; perhaps he is. In spite of this com­
pleteness of characterization, Bloom seems a failure as an 
individual character. To study Bloom in terms of the in­
dividual character proves disappointing and fruitless.
Bloom, the individual, with his passive attitude and his 
emphasis on equanimity turns into a complicated but gutless 
worm. Neither God nor man can afford an attitude of com­
plete tolerance. Bloom, in fact, does not remain always 
tolerant: he cannot turn the other cheek in his argument
with the citizen in the bar; neither is he above an attempt 
at moral correction in regard to Stephen's riotous living. 
But he would have us believe that his acceptance of Holly's 
conduct results from his magnanimity and not from his con- 
trived rationalization. For Leopold Bloom there is pathos, 
but no aspect of the moral conflict. The probing of the 
individual will is the material for the moral conflict and 
Bloom is not built to stand the cross-fire of an examination 
of the will. Procedure of examination from a moral point 
of view will reduce Bloom to an insignificant, weak little 
Irishman who cannot escape the tag of Jew.
The insular nature of comedy provides a world in 
which individual moral questions have no place; we must be 
able to look at Bloom without subjecting him to moral
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judgment, for he cannot withstand it. He is closer to the 
type than to the individual character. He is not everyman, 
but he is an average man; and as an average man, he becomes 
a symbol of what seems to me a§ indictment of society.
Joyce has created his Poldy and put him on display. He 
seems to be saying: I don't know how much of this character
fits any one of you, but some of him is true of most.
The reader travels with Bloom through a pretty
common day. By the time he arrives home with Bloom, he is
as worn out as the traveller himself, and he finds that
Bloom is going through a process which D. H. Lawrence would
have called "death in life." There is no struggle of the
soul for Bloom; his life is spiritually static. He does
have some little remorse of conscience: he is plagued by
his memories of past petty crimes, and he has hallucinations
in which he is rebuked for his behavior by his dead parents;
but in the final analysis, Bloom's life struggle is summed
up in the passage:
What were habitually his final meditations?
Of some one sole unique advertisement to 
cause passers to stop in wonder, a poster novel­
ty, with all extraneous accretions excluded, re­
duced to its simplest and most efficient terms 
not exceeding the span of causal vision and 
congruous with the velocity of modern life.^0
Bloom's position is an acceptance of the defeat and futility
of life, not one of conflict and struggle. He is a social
^°James Joyce, Ulysses (New York, 1946), p. 705.
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character, not an individual one. And, as Zink's defini­
tion of comedy would indicate, Bloom's character is exposed; 
his will is not examined.
Up to this point in th& discussion, we have dealt 
with literature concerned with characters and their con­
flicts; that is, with dramatic literature. It is only in 
dramatic literature that the moral attitude may be realized. 
There are two reasons for this: first, we must have
character to have conflict; and second, dramatic literature 
is long enough to permit the conscientiousness of pursuit 
which is necessary to the moral attitude. Several critics 
have been aware of the fact that the moral attitude emerges 
from the dramatic situation. As I have already indicated, 
Brooks and Warren have suggested the relationship of the 
moral to conflict and fiction. Aristotle, long ago in the 
Poetics, recognized the impact of the moral on character.
He wrote: "Character is that which reveals moral purpose,
showing what kinds of things a man chooses to avoid."11 
Norman Foerster also points directly to the dramatic situa­
tion as that which reveals conflict between thought and 
action:
In literature, reason and the ethical ima­
gination, contemplating man and the grounds of 
his happiness and unhappiness, speak to us with 
an incomparable fullness and clarity; and they 
do this with maximum facility in the drama,
11Aristotle, Poetics, trans. S. H. Butcher, The 
Great Critics, James H. Smith and Edd W. Parks, eds. (New 
York, 1951), p. 35.
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because the essence of drama, as of human life, 
is action, external action in relation to the inner springs of action.12
And Sidney Zink too is aware of the importance of the drama­
tic situation for the expression of the moral attitude:
I think the moral potentialities of art are 
greatest in tragedy and are in fact limited to 
literature— and, specifically, to dramatic 
literature (meaning by this, however, the crea­
tive presentation of character, whatever the 
specific literary devices— that is, whether 
the method be chiefly dialogue, narrative, or 
stream-of-consciousness description; whether it 
be staged, read, or heard; and whether it be in prose or verse).13
But none of the critics has come so close as Brooks and
Warren to pointing out that there are some situations which
demand a moral treatment, and that if those demands are not
met, a corrupt literature will result.
We must not be confused by the term dramatic; there 
are those who see the writing of a poem as a dramatic 
situation in which the poet "meets” the incident which he 
—i«uto express (Winters would fit this category). But it 
is my contention that there can be no moral conflict, as 
we have defined it, developed in the short poem, though it 
may be dramatic in this subtle sense. There is a certain 
class of poems such as Carl Sandburg’s poem ”Fog,” or 
Tennyson's "The Eagle,” or Herrick's "Upon Julia’s Clothes" 
which we might classify as descriptive and which would not
^ The Intent, p. 73.
13 -7 - 1 Zink.
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confuse us as far as the drama and the moral conflict are 
concerned. But we do not have to wander very far in the 
fields of literature to stumble into short poetry which 
offers an apparent dramatic situation and moral conflict.
Is there not some drama as well as conflict in such poems 
as Andrew Marvell's poem "To His Coy Mistress," and Robert 
Frost's "Stopping by the Woods"?/
In regard to the first, we might say that a certain 
dramatic situation is set up by the artist: that of the
lover pleading for the favors and affections of his lady.
But we must also see that if we apply our criterion for the 
moral conflict, we will not get very far with this poem.
The poem is the expression of a whim on the part of a 
lover— it is a rationalization which intends to confirm 
what the lover already wants to believe. There is no 
rational development, no conscientiousness of pursuit of 
the right moral answer, and no action of deliberate intention, 
which we have determined we must have in order to have a 
moral conflict. The situation remains only potentially 
dramatic, for there is no action involved; it remains only 
an incident. Whether or not the poem is moral by convention­
al standards is not the concern of the critic. Its intention 
is to express the fancy of a lover and the only conflict in­
volved is whether the lady will or will not grant the favor 
to her lover, after his elaborate attempt at seduction.
And we are, alas, kept ever in darkness as to the outcome 
of that conflict. There is no intention of a moral theme;
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there is nothing in the poem to demand treatment through 
the moral attitude; and therefore we can say nothing about 
the poem critically in terms of morality.
In Frost's poem, a slightly different situation is 
developed. Again, we have the treatment of dramatic inci­
dent, and an apparent conflict exists in the poem; but in 
this case, the "I" of the poem is offered a decision and 
that decision is resolved. The driver of the sleigh makes 
a decision in favor of the responsibility which the world 
imposes on its inhabitants: he forgoes the desire to linger
and enjoy the beauty and tranquility of the natural scene—  
for he has "promises to keep." The dramatic situation is 
somewhat more complete here, for it leads to action. But 
in this case also, we have only the treatment of immediate 
incident. The driver's decision is conclusive. We do not 
have, as we do in Lear, an examination of the implications 
of the choice. The driver makes his choice and that is an 
end of it; there is no extension of the moral theme; there 
is no process through which the solution must be "earned,? 
and therefore there is no reason for us to believe that the 
poet has chosen a theme which demands the conscientious 
treatment of the moral attitude. We can say nothing about 
the poem critically in terms of morality.
In each poem, the main reason we cannot use the moral 
attitude as a critical factor to determine the adequacy of 
the treatment of conflict is that the length of the'poems 
will not allow the comprehensive development of conflict
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that the moral attitude requires. The short poem is con­
fined to incident and the moral attitude as a critical 
factor is not relevant. There is much fine poetry in 
King Lear which, if taken out $f context, will remain fine 
poetry though it is brief. Lear's speech to the elements 
which begins:
Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! Rage! 
Blow!
You cataracts and hurricanoes, spout
Till you have drench'd our steeples, drown'd 
the cocks (III.ii.1-3)!
if taken out of context, would provide a magnificent inci­
dent of rage and defiance against the world on the part of 
the protagonist; but though the moral attitude provides the 
structure for the whole drama, we could not apply it criti­
cally to that speech if that were all we knew of Lear.
In the same way, we might be confused by an apparent 
moral conflict in a poem such as Browning's "My Last 
Duchess." For we might say, surely, here is the presenta- 
tion of evil; here is Browning's Iago, or his Roger Chill- 
ingworth. And there may be some cause for those analogies; 
but we must remember that Iago or Roger Chillingworth, out 
of their contexts, present no moral conflict. It is only 
through the association of the characters with their total 
dramatic situations that we recognize the presence of the 
moral conflict and the moral attitude. There is no larger 
context for the Browning poem; it, as all short poems, re­
mains only incident to which the moral attitude doesfnot 
apply.
Any of these poems might possibly be extended to 
develop a situation of moral conflict which would demand 
the conscientious pursuit of the moral attitude. We might 
compare Andrew Marvell’s poem *i.To His Coy Mistress" to 
Hemingway's novel A Farewell to Arms to indicate the ex­
tension of incident in Marvell's poem to the moral conflict 
of Hemingway's characters.
Hemingway's novel does not represent so comprehensive
a treatment of the moral conflict as Shakespeare's King
Lear. Few literary works do. But A Farewell to Arms, as
a serious novel, does represent a comprehensive treatment
of a moral theme. It is concerned with ideal values of good
and evil in the world. In his introduction to Hemingway's
novel, Robert Penn Warren writes: "The book, even if it
does not end with a solution that is generally acceptable,
still embodies a moral effort and is another document of
14the human effort to achieve ideal values." The attempt
vJP
to achieve ideal values is indicated in the novel through 
the moral conflict of the hero, Frederick Henry; and 
Hemingway attempts a solution through what is essentially 
an extension of the theme of Marvell's poem. At one point 
in the novel, he uses some verses from it; Frederick and 
Catherine are in a hotel room on the night on which Frederick 
must leave to go to the front lines again. Frederick re­
lates:
l^Robert Penn Warren, "Introduction," A Farewell to
Arms (New York, 1949), p. xxxiii.
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The waiter came and took away the things,
After a while we were very still and we could 
hear the rain. Down on the street a motor car 
honked.
"'But at my back I always hear
Time's winged chariot hurrying near,1"
I said.
"I know that poem," Catherine said. "It's 
by Marvell. But it's about a girl who wouldn't 
live with a man."15
Catherine and Frederick have been living together although 
they are unmarried and Hemingway is to use this convention­
ally immoral situation to get at the larger moral concern 
of ideal good. Catherine's comment is significant; it looks 
back to the beginning of the novel in which Hemingway begins 
the moral conflict of the novel by indicating Catherine's 
conventional moral conflict. When Catherine first meets 
Frederick in the hospital, we find that she has apparently 
been in the situation of Marvell's lady in "To His Coy 
Mistress." She, like the lady in the poem, had refused the 'v*>
advances of her lover and she has found that the poet's 
attitude may very well have been right. She and her lover 
had courted for eight years and Catherine tells Frederick 
that she was a fool not to marry him. Frederick, who is 
grossly intent upon seduction, comments that she has beauti­
ful hair and Catherine responds:
15
1949 15Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (New York, ), p. 161.
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"I was going to cut it all off when he died."
"No."
"I wanted to do something for him. You see 
I didn’t care about the other thing and he could 
have had it all. Be could Jiave had anything he 
wanted if I would have known. I would have 
married him or anything. I know all about it 
now. But then he wanted to go to war and Ididn't k n o w . "16
Conventional morality would contend that Catherine 
had done the virtuous and right thing, and we assume that 
Catherine thought so at the time; but she cannot see the 
good of conventional morality so clearly now that her lover 
is dead. She feels that if the situation should arise again, 
she would not refuse anything to her lover; she would not 
wait eight years to determine whether she was in love.
There is neither world enough nor time. Catherine's action 
in terms of her attitude toward conventional morality will 
involve Frederick, and it will be the purpose of the novel 
to examine the results of the actions of the lovers in terms 
of the total conflict in which they are involved.
The initial conflict is not solved entirely for 
Catherine in the beginning; the idea of complete surrender 
is still repulsive to her. As Frederick tries to kiss her 
prematurely, she is offended and slaps his face:
Her hand hit my nose and eyes, and tears came 
in my eyes from the reflex.
"IJm so sorry," she said. I felt I had a 
certain advantage.
Farewell to Arms, p. 19.
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"You were quite right.”
"I'm dreadfully sorry," she said. "I just 
couldn't stand the nurse's-evening-off aspect 
of it. I didn't mean to hurt you. I did hurt 
you, didn't I?"
She was looking at me in the dark. I was 
angry and yet certain, seeing it all ahead like 
the moves in a chess game.^
Catherine is concerned with conventional moral conflict at 
this point, but Frederick is not in conflict regarding his 
relationship to Catherine. He is simply planning a seduc­
tion,, and his plan is very clear and standard— like the 
moves in a chess game. He is confused by Catherine's 
attitude, but his plan is clear. He says:
I thought she was probably a little crazy.
It was all right if she was, I did not care 
what I was getting into. This was better than 
going every evening to the house for officers 
where the girls climbed all over you and put 
your cap on backward as a sign of affection 
between their trips upstairs with brother offi­
cers, I knew I did not love Catherine Barkley 
nor had any idea of loving her. This was a 
game, like bridge, in which you said things
instead of playing cards.
But it is not long before his attitude toward 
Catherine changes; he begins to feel a responsibility toward
her. When he goes to see her at their next appointed
meeting, he finds that she is not feeling well and will not 
see him:
17A Farewell to Arms, p. 26.
18Ibid., p. 31.
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I went out the door and suddenly I felt 
lonely and empty. I had treated Catherine very 
lightly, I had gotten somewhat drunk and had 
nearly forgotten to come but when I could not 
see her there I was feeling lonely and hollow.
Catherine becomes more than juet a "better deal" than the
club for officers, and Frederick is beset with a conflict
which adds to his spiritual turmoil. Robert Penn Warren
has defined him as the "sleepless man." He is concerned
about the meaninglessness and the slaughter of the war, the
debauchery of his nights in bars and brothels, and the
disparity between his life and that of the priest who speaks
of the cold, clear, dry country of Abruzzi. The priest's
country represents an ideal world apart from the weary
2 0activity of war. Frederick's world of war is analogous
to Lear's world of turmoil on the heath. Lear too has
questions about good and evil in the world. Frederick
faces much the same conflict which Sewall indicates Hester
Prynne faces. He is in conflict with himself, his society
and his God. The conflict with himself is shown in his
discussion with the priest when he admits to the priest that
he did not go to the Abruzzi on his leave, but spent his
nights and days in debauchery:
That night at the mess I sat next to the priest 
and he was disappointed and suddenly hurt that 
I had not gone to the Abruzzi, He had written 
to his father that I was coming and they had made
preparations. I myself felt badly as he did and
i 9A Farewell to Arms, p. 43. 
^ Ibid. , p. xxviii.
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could not understand why I had not gone. It was 
what I had wanted to do and I tried to explain 
how one thing had led to another and finally he
saw it and understood that I had really wanted
to go and it was almost all right. I had drunk 
much wine and afterward coffee and Strega and I 
explained, winefuliby, how we did not do the
things we wanted to do; we never did such
things.21
His conflict with his society is indicated in his conversa­
tion with the patriot Gino. Gino mouths the words of his 
society; he is filled with the concepts of the patriot and 
he tells Frederick that they cannot talk about losing the 
war. "What has been done this summer cannot have been done 
in vain," he tells Frederick. Frederick says:
I did not say anything. I was always em­
barrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and 
sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had 
heard them, sometimes standing in the rain al­
most out of earshot, so that only the shouted 
words came through, and had read them, on pro­
clamations that were slapped up by billposters 
over the other proclamations, now for a long 
time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the 
things that were glorious had no glory and the 
sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago 
if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it.22
His conflict with his God is suggested in the conversation 
with the priest when the priest comes to see him in the 
hospital after he has been wounded. The priest says:
"There in my country it is understood that a 
man may love God. It is not a dirty joke."
"I understand."
He looked at me and smiled.
21A Farewell to Arms, p. 13.
0 9Ibid., p. 191.
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"You understand but you do not love God."
"No."
"You do not love him at all?" he asked.
2 3"I am afraid of kim in the night sometimes."
All of these conflicts gather about the love affair
of Catherine and Frederick. It is that love affair which 
is to attempt a solution of the conflicts for the lovers 
through ideal love, just as Cordelia's love presents an 
ideal solution for Lear. The matter of conventional moral­
ity regarding the love affair becomes insignificant in com­
parison with the larger conflicts of good and evil with which 
the lovers must deal. We feel that Catherine may be quite
right when she insists that they are married: "What good
would it do to marry now? We're really married. I couldn't 
be any more married" (p. 119). The marriage ceremony be­
comes only a formality; we cannot feel that there is any­
thing viciously evil in their actions. And their love may 
provide a solution for the greater moral conflicts. The 
limits of space and time which the war imposes upon the 
lovers creates an urgency which overshadows the rules of 
conventional morality; the lovers' pursuit of a solution 
for their greater moral conflicts will indicate something 
about ideal good.
Frederick's desertion from the army is also a viola­
tion of conventional moral standards. But under the
23A Farewell to Arms, pp. 74-75.
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circumstances "honor" becomes insane. Frederick’s moral 
responsibility to the army is over:
Anger was washed away in the river along with 
any obligation. Although that ceased when the 
carabiniere put his hands on my collar. I would 
like to have had the uniform off although I did 
not care much about the outward forms. I had 
taken off the stars, but that was for conven­
ience. It was no point of honor. I was not 
against them. I was through.24
The remainder of the novel is a presentation of the 
happy life which Catherine and Frederick enjoy while they 
are together. The conflicts are largely put behind; they 
are temporarily solved by the pleasure they take in their 
love. Conflict in the novel becomes largely physical— the 
physical problems of Frederick’s evading the police. The 
moral conflict breaks down at this point and that is partly 
why we can say that the treatment of the moral problem is 
less comprehensive than that of King Lear. The emphasis 
shifts from the moral conflict to temporal happiness, and 
the conflict loses its poignancy. We might consider, for 
example, the loss of intensity which would result if Shake­
speare had lingered on the happiness of Cordelia and Lear 
at their reunion and had gone on to tell us about the sub­
sequent joy they might have had through several months 
following the reunion, before they enter the violence of 
the fifth act. Neither can we say that Frederick’s hard­
ships after he escapes from the battle police are focused
O tlA Farewell to Arms, p. 241.
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on the moral conflict, as Lear's hardships on the heath are. 
The process of Frederick's getting to Catherine (and, after, 
their escape to Switzerland) is largely a matter of narra­
tive device used to get at th% confligt again at the end of 
the novel. The physical conflict is dramatic, but it is 
distinct from the moral.
As a result of the lapse in intensity of moral con­
flict, Hemingway's conclusion represents a less certain 
moral solution than that of King Lear. The moral conflict 
in the novel appears in the initial pursuit of the "right 
solution"; the certainty of solution is less fully realized. 
In Lear we feel the solution to be certain and final; for 
Frederick Henry the solution is not final and it may be un­
stable. We feel I think that Frederick has determined at 
least one ideal good in the world through his love for 
Catherine. We may say that his effort to tell the story 
as narrator suggests the meaningfulness of love to him, and 
we may look back to his comment on the priest early in the 
novel to support the idea that after his experience with 
Catherine he has something in common with the priest and 
his ideal values. He says of the priest: "He had always
known what I did not know and what, when I learned it, I 
was always able to forget. But I did not know that then, 
although I learned it later" (p. 14). He has determined 
an ideal good in the world, although his solution is not 
final as it is in the case of Lear. Robert Penn Warren 
has this to say about the solution of the novel:
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In the end, with the death of Catherine, 
Frederick discovers that the attempt to find a 
substitute for universal meaning in the limited 
meaning of the personal relationship is doomed 
to failure. It is doomed because it is liable 
to all the accidents of a world in which human 
beings are like ants running back and forth on 
a log burning in a campfire and in which death 
is, as Catherine says just before her own death, 
"just a dirty trick." But this does not deny 
the value of the effort . . . .25
Frederick’s ideal does not offer the final solution which
Lear's does; it does not transcend the cruelties of the
world. But the effort is valuable and the moral attitude
is a shaping factor which presents the moral conflict in
the novel.
Marvell's poem only presents an incident: the plea
of a lover for his lady's affections. Hemingway's novel 
expands that incident through the moral conflict to explore 
its moral implications, not in terms of conventional moral­
ity, but in terms of the ideal moral attitude.
A Farewell to Arms, p. xxxi,2 5
CONCLUSION
Morality may appear in literary criticism with three 
general connotations: as the didactic; as an extension of
the didactic, the function of literature in the world; and 
as moral conflict, representing the moral attitude.
The didactic is useful chiefly as a negative critical 
term: ordinarily we use it only to indicate a flaw in the
literary work. Seldom is the didactic praised, although we 
should not forget that it is sometimes a functional element 
that deserves praise. Shakespeare's Polonius is an excel­
lent literary creation, and his success is partially a 
result of his presentation as one who gives platitudinous 
advice. The didactic, however, represents only one conno- 
tation of morality in criticism. It is the easiest aspect 
of morality to recognize and may be easily dealt with: if
it protrudes from the work, we consider it a fault; but if 
it is functional in the work, we consider it an asset.
The second connotation of morality in criticism, the 
imposition of a presupposed function of literature as a 
critical device, provides the most pervasive problem of the 
three general connotations. The function of literature, 
what literature does or should do in the world, is "a~phil­
osophical problem. Literature may have a social function,
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a cognitive function, or an instructional function in the 
world, but we cannot judge its literary merit by any of its 
functions. The imposition of function on critical doctrine 
may lead to a dogmatism which>tw0uld b£ disastrous to 
literary judgment. Tolstoy's judgment of art works has 
given us an example of the results of dogmatic judgment.
The function of literature in the world is not only irrele­
vant, but dangerous to literary criticism.
The third connotation of morality, the moral conflict 
as it represents the moral attitude, can be an important 
critical device. When it is comprehensively employed by 
the artist, it may result in powerful expression, as it 
does in King Lear. In its least use, it can add greatly 
to character development as it does to Dreiser's Hurstwood. 
But if its restrictions are not recognized in the treatment 
of the moral theme, it will result in a corrupt fiction.
It is not useful in the criticism of all literary works; 
as we have seen, the work must be dramatic and extended. 
Comedy meets both demands but it has its own goals and is 
not concerned with the individual conflict. The short poem 
is inadequate because of its length; it remains only inci­
dent. Even the short poem which seemingly treats a moral 
issue must be expanded, as we have shown by comparing 
Hemingway's novel, A Farewell to Arms, to Marvell's poem,
"To His Coy Mistress," to express the conscientious moral 
pursuit.
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The confusions of the connotations of morality as it 
is used in critical discussions have created a misleading 
idea of the relation of morality to literary criticism.
The formalist critics were partly right in their objection 
to the imposition of the function of literature on critical 
doctrine (it seems to me that their objection to morality 
was a matter of function, though they have not called it 
that). But they objected so strongly that they overlooked 
the possibility of morality being useful in another way. 
Recent articles by formalist critics indicate that the 
critics are beginning to recognize the severity of their 
initial judgment on morality. In an article in The Kenyon 
Review of 1952, Ransom indicates that he realizes that 
literary criticism is not merely a matter of the examina­
tion of words and that the critic of fiction needs more 
tools with which to work:
So in an age of unusual critical achievement 
we have managed to arrive rather quickly at an 
excruciating impasse: with cold-blooded critics
of poetry working away at what sometimes appear 
to be the merest exercises with words; and warm­
blooded critics of the critics of poetry re­
proaching their exercises and perhaps about to 
reproach their poetry too.
How confidently, twenty years or so past, 
were some of us offering a new "understanding of 
poetry"! I will not say, How brashly; for the 
innovation was real, it was momentous; but it 
was not complete, and now it has bogged down at 
a most embarrassing point.1
^John Crowe Ransom, "Poets and Flatworms," Kenyon 
Review, XIV (Winter, 1952), 157-162.
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Ransom indicates that a problem exists but he does not 
offer a solution.
In the second edition of Understanding Poetry in a
postscript to their "Letter T<j The Teacher," Cleanth Brooks 
and Robert Penn Warren also indicate that they are aware of 
the problems created by the moral attitude:
A study of poetry that starts from the notion 
of the poem as a little drama can scarcely be 
said to ignore the human materials that enter 
into poetry, for the dramatic situation is dra­
matic only because it urgently involves human 
impulses. As the poem starts from an urgent 
situation, so it ends by making, directly or 
indirectly,a comment on human conduct and human 
values. And no good poem makes a merely trivial 
comment. . . . What the relation is between 
this intrinsic value and other values is a most 
vexed and delicate question, one that can scarce­
ly be settled here. Perhaps it can never be 
settled.^
What the authors are suggesting here is that the implications 
of literature (that is, the effects of literature on the 
individual or on society— what we have called the function 
<©£ literature in the world) are problems which cannot be 
taken up in literary discussion. They are not distinctly 
literary problems and their solutions must necessarily be 
conjecture. We have suggested that the implications of 
literature in the world are more properly taken up by the 
philosopher, the sociologist or the psychologist. But 
Brooks and Warren are aware that the moral poses problems 
for the critic and, as I have indicated in an earlier section
2Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding 
Poetry (New York, 1950), p. xxiv.
69
of this paper, they have come close to a solution in their 
discussion of the dramatic conflict. They do not concen­
trate on the distinctly moral conflict, but with the help 
of Zink’s definition and the extended analyses I have given 
of individual works which deal with a moral situation, the 
importance of the distinctly moral conflict should be clear.
It may be true that in his heart the critic will 
always exercise his personal judgment to determine his 
favorite works. And history only, perhaps, can determine 
the greatness of literary works according to both their 
technical excellence and their function. But to avoid 
mistaken judgment, we should keep criticism objective.
T. S. Eliot has reminded us: "The ’greatness’ of literature
cannot be determined solely by literary standards; though 
we must remember that whether it is literature or not can 
be determined only by literary standards."3
My investigation of the ways in which the concept of 
morality appears mistakenly in literary discussions, and 
the analyses given of the distinctly moral conflict in 
literary works will, I hope, clarify some of the problems 
related to morality in literary criticism and will indicate 
that the concept of morality as it concerns the moral con­
flict has a definite place in literary criticism as an ob­
jective critical factor.
3T. S. Eliot, "Religion and Literature," Selected 
Essays (New York, 1950), p. 343.
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